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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ONEL J. BARNETT and 
EVELYN I. BARNETT, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
STATE AUTOMOBILE & 
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE 
AGENCY, and A-1 AGENCIES 
DIVERSIFIED, Defendants. 
Case No. 
12264 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATE1\1ENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
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STATEl\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs on a fire in-
surance policy issued by Defendant for a fire loss which 
occurred in Plaintiffs' home. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs received judgment based on a jury ver-
dict against Defendants, State Automobile & Casualty 
Underwriters and Diversified Insurance Agency, in the 
amount of $23,484.04. Defendant A-1 Agencies Diversi-
fied received a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiffs' com-
plaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to have the judgment of the Trial 
Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since Plaintiffs are entitled to have the facts re-
viewed in a light most favorable to them and since De-
fendant's brief fails to so review the facts, we deem it 
necessary to restate them. 
This action arose from a fire loss in Plaintiffs' home 
at Vernal, Utah on October 19, 1967. Plaintiffs filed suit 
against State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, the 
2 
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insurer, and Diversified Insurance Agency and A-1 
Agencies Diversified, the agents, claiming as to the in-
surer, liability on a fire insurance policy, and as to the 
agents, liability for negligence and breach of contract. 
(R. 58-62) 
The policy in question was issued and counter-
signed by Diversified. The insurer was Guarantee Se-
curity Insurance Co. Later, the policy was assumed by 
Defendant State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters. 
The policy period was from October 1, 1964 to October 
1, 1967. The fire occurred on October 19, 1967, some 19 
days after the alleged expiration of the policy. The 
morning following the fire, Plaintiff, Onel J. Barnett, 
notified Diversified of the fire by telephone and request-
ed them to send an adjuster. ( R. 182) . Not hearing from 
Diversified for three or four days, Barnett again called 
and was informed that his insurance had expired. Plain-
tiffs mailed a check pre-dated to October 1, 1967, as pay-
ment on the policy. (R. 217) The check was returned. 
Plaintiffs expected to receive a notice of the expira-
tion of the fire insurance policy and a bill for the renewal 
premium. They received no notice of any kind and no 
bill. ( R. 183) 
Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant insurance com-
pany is based on a course of dealing over a period of ap-
proximately 18 years. It was adopted by Diversified and 
State Auto. The course of dealing consisted of notifica-
tion of expiration and billing for renewal of fire insur-
ance policies. 
3 
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One Noble Kimball procured fire insurance policies 
for Plaintiffs for approximately 18 years. On every oc-
casion when a policy was about to expire, Kimball would 
notify Plaintiffs either by mail or in person and then re-
new their policy and bill them for the premium. ( R. 170) 
On one occasion when Kimball had failed to see Plain-
tiffs and was planning to be out of the state, he paid the 
premium himself and billed Plaintiffs for it. This con-
cerned a fire policy with the Pearl Assurance Co. with a 
term from July 5, 1961, to July 5, 1964. (Ex. 2P) Dur-
ing these years, Plaintiffs relied entirely on this course 
of dealing in order to keep themselves continually in-
sured. (R. 169-173) 
When the Pearl Assurance Co. policy was about to 
expire, Kimball brought Richard Salisbury, an officer 
in Diversified Insurance Agency, to see Barnett. He in-
troduced Salisbury to Barnett and informed Barnett 
that for reasons of health, he was retiring and that Salis-
bury would take his place and handle his insurance ex-
actly as it had been handled in the past. Salisbury agreed 
that he would so perform and then proceeded to obtain 
the policy in question for the Barnetts. A letter dated 
November 2, 1964, from Diversified by Salisbury con-
firmed this arrangement. (Ex. 3P) On being questioned 
in detail concerning the conversation with Kimball and 
Salisbury, on cross-examination, Plaintiff, Onel J. Bar-
nett, testified as follows: (R. 189, 190) 
"Q. In other words did he ask you specifically? 
You didn't tell .Mr. Salisbury that you want-
4 
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ed notice of a certain number of days before 
a policy expired did you? 
A. I told him I wanted it handled just like it 
had been handled before. We agreed on it. 
Q. And you didn't tell him at that time how 
Mr. Kimball had been handling it, did you? 
A. He said he knew. 
Q. But you didn't tell him how Mr. Kimball 
had been handling the insurance? 
A. Yes, I believe I did. 
Q. And as far as that is concerned specifically 
he didn't promise or say he would send you a 
notice or telephone call and tell you about an 
expiration date did he? 
A. He promised that he would, to the nearest 
of his ability, he would continue as had been 
carried on." 
and further (R. 191) 
"Q. And it's also true that you didn't directly call 
anybody in the Gurantee Security Insurance 
Co. and State Auto and ask that they renew 
the policy either? 
A. I always paid by statement and notice, I 
didn't call nobody, I answered their letters 
with a check." 
Following the issuance of the policy, Diversified 
continued to service it. On July 19, 1966, Diversified is-
sued a personal articles floater which added a camera to 
the coverage. (Ex. 13P) On the assumption endorse-
ment attached to the policy in question (Ex. IP), where-
5 
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by as of February 28, 1966, State Auto assumed the 
policy, the name of Diversified Insurance Agency was 
typed at the top. On the change and attaching clause en-
dorsement dated June 19, 1966, stating that the policy is 
reinstated, this document was issued and signed by Di-
versified Insurance Agency. (Ex. 14P) Also during 
the course of the policy in question, Plaintiffs submitted 
a glass claim which was handled by Diversified (R. 199) 
Barnett had always relied on Kimball to send him a 
bill so that he would know how much to pay for the in-
surance coverage. (R. 203) Barnett intended to renew 
his policy at such time as it expired and would have paid 
a bill had it been sent to him. (R. 184) 
William H. Slaugh, an insurance agent in the Ver-
nal area for approximately 19 years testified that he is 
acquainted with a custom and practice which is uniform 
in this area pertaining to agents who issue policies. He 
testified that the custom and practice is that the agent 
sends out bills ahead of time and where necessary issues 
the policies 15 to 30 days ahead of the expiration date. 
If the insured hasn't paid it by the time the policy ex-
pires, they notify their insured and give him an oppor-
tunity to reinstate the policy. (R. 247) 
On Cross-examination, Slaugh testified (R. 249): 
"Q. But there is no obligation on the part of the 
company to renew any policy if he doesn't 
want it on the expiration date, is there? They 
can turn it down? 
A. There is-I don't know whether it's a set 
6 
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rule or a general rule but they are notified 
30 days ahead of time, and especially if there 
is a mortgage on the property." 
and again at R. 251: 
"Q. Suppose an agent in Salt Lake has a con-
tract and suppose the distance is such from 
here to Vernal and it's difficult to inspect 
and there is no other insurance out there that 
this agent has, would it be logical for him to 
just let the policy run out if he didn't want to 
have any more business out there? 
A. It wouldn't be logical and it wouldn't be 
ethical to just run it out. 
Q. It wouldn't be ethical? Why wouldn't it be 
ethical? 
A. I just don't do business that way, I would 
pay the premiums, and I just don't drop 
them, just not even notify them that there 
is nothing taking place." 
Mr. Ellwood Johnson, the manager of defendant's 
Denver branch office testified that defendant cancelled 
the agency of Diversified on November 28, 1964. The 
evidence showed, however, that on June 19, 1966 Diversi-
fied signed the change and attaching clause endorsement 
as defendant's agent. (Ex. 14P) Also on July 12, 1966, 
Diversified was shown on the Personal Articles Floater 
as defendant's agent. (Ex. 13P) Defendant did not ex-
plain this inconsistency. (R. 279) Johnson further ad-
mitted that State Auto gave no notice of this cancella-
tion to the Plaintiffs. (R. 279) 
7 
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POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT 
AND JUDGMENT. 
The evidence amply supports the verdict rendered 
by the jury. The jury was properly instructed on the law 
and, therefore, the verdict and judgment should be af-
firmed. 
A. DIVERSIFIED WAS THE AGENT OF 
STATE AUTO ON OCTOBER l, 1967. 
I. .A.s to Plaintiffs, State .A. uto cannot terminate the 
agency without giving notice. 
Clearly, pursuant to the statutes and case law, Di-
versified was the agent of State Auto at all times in is-
sue. 31-17-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines "agent" 
as follows: 
"'Agent' means any person authorized by an in-
surer and on its behalf to solicit applicatJons for 
insurance, to effectuate and counter-sign insur-
ance contracts, except as to life or disability in-
surances, and to collect premiums on insurances 
so applied for or effectuated. * * *" 
The evidence in this case was undisputed that Di-
versified fell within that definition. Also, according to 
the holding in the case of Farrington v. Granite State 
Fire Insurance Co. of Portsmouth, et al. (1951) 120 
Utah 109, 232 P 2d 754, Diversified was clearly the 
agent of State Auto. 
8 
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The trial Court correctly instructed the jury in In-
struction No. 13 (R. 94) that Diversified was the legal 
agent of the insurer in whose name the policy in question 
was issued as of October 1, 1964. The Court further in-
structed in the same instruction, that such an agency once 
established is "presumed under the law to continue until 
parties insured by such agent have been notified of the 
termination of such agency, and such agent may bind 
the company by his further acts until notice of the revo-
cation of the agent's authority by the insurer is brought 
to the attention of persons who have dealt with that 
agent." The latter part of the instruction just discussed, 
is clearly in line with the general authority on this sub-
j act as stated at 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, par. 154, at 
p. 210: 
"'Vhere an insurer terminates an agency, the re-
vocation is effective as to all third persons having 
notice or knowledge of such revocation, and the 
agent cannot thereafter bind the insurer with re-
spect to such third persons by purporting to act 
as agent. It is the duty of an insurance company 
to notify insured persons who have dealt with 
their agent as the representative of the company 
of the termination of his authority. If it fails to 
do so, it is bound by his acts if such a person con-
tinues to deal with him as the representative of 
the company, in ignorance of the termination of 
the agency. This rule is based on the general prin-
ciple that the acts of an age.nt ~ithin the app~~ent 
scope of his authority are bmdmg on the prmc1pal 
as against one who had formerly dealt with him 
through the agent and who had no notice of the 
revocation." 
9 
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The evidence was undisputed that Defendant did 
not notify Plaintiffs of the claimed termination of the 
agency of Diversified. Defendant's manager, Johnson, 
testified : ( R. 279) 
"Q. But you didn't tell these people that Diver-
sified was not your agent any more, did you? 
A N . " . o, Sll'. 
B. DIVERSIFIED ADOPTED THE 
COURSE OF DEALING EX I S T IN G BE-
TWEEN NOBLE KIMBALL AND PLAIN-
TIFFS. 
The evidence established a course of dealing of some 
18 years between Plaintiffs and Noble Kimball. The 
course of dealing established the practice of notification 
of expiration of fire insurance policies and automatic re-
newal. Plaintiffs came to rely on this course of dealing 
and merely waited for the notification and the bill before 
paying the premium. The evidence showed that on one 
occasion when Noble Kimball had been unable to con-
tact Plaintiffs, he paid the premium himself and sent a 
bill for reimbursement. The evidence further showed 
that when Kimball turned over the business to Diversi-
fied, he took Richard Salisbury with him and introduced 
him to Plaintiffs. Salisbury agreed that he would handle 
the business just as it had been handled in the past. On 
cross-examination, it was brought out that the matter of 
notification had been specifically discussed and that Sal-
isbury was told of the practice between Kimball and 
10 
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Plaintiffs and agreed that he would continue it. Accord-
ingly, Diversified adopted this course of dealing. 
C. STATE AUTO ACCEPTED THE COV-
ERAGE AND BECAME HOUND BY THE 
KNOWLEDGE AND ADOPTION OF THE 
COURSE OF DEALING BY DIVERSIFIED. 
When State Auto accepted the coverage, it adopted 
the course of dealing. The Farrington case is clear au-
thority for this proposition. The Court held that when 
the insurance company accepted the application and is-
sued the policy, it was charged with the knowledge ac-
quired by the agent in the course of taking the applica-
tion and forwarding it to the company. The Court states 
at p. 115: 
"It seems quite inconsistent for them to accept 
the advantages of everything he did for their 
benefit and yet insist that they are not respons-
ible for the knowledge he acquired about the 
building within the necessary and ordinary scope 
of his duties in handling the transaction. From the 
facts stated, he was their agent and they are 
charged with his knowledge. It certainly would 
be casting an unreasonable burden upon a lay 
person to require him to make inquiry beyo.nd the 
authority of Mr. Bowman under the circum-
stances which were present here." 
In that case, the Court, under a similar type of 
agency transaction, held that the company was charged 
with the knowledge of the agent concerning the insured 
building and its condition before issuing the policies. 
11 
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Just as in that case, Diversified in this case took the ap-
plication, forwarded it to State Auto, collected the pre-
miums, countersigned the policy, and placed its sticker 
thereon. Under such a situation, according to the author-
ity of the Farrington case, the knowledge of Diversified 
concerning the course of dealing was imputed to State 
Auto, and by issuing the policy, State Auto adopted the 
course of dealing to notify Plaintiffs of the expiration 
of the policy and to properly renew it. 
The Farrington case cites with approval the case of 
New Brunswick Fire Insurance Co. v. Nichols (1923) 
210 Ala. 63, 97 So. 82. In that case, Plaintiff applied for 
a fire insurance policy to an agent who represented Hart-
ford Insurance Company and informed the agent of the 
nature of his interest in the land involved. He had a lease 
with an option to purchase, the option not having been 
exercised. The agent issued the policy and collected the 
premium. Thereafter, Hartford cancelled the policy and 
returned the premium. This agent then went to an agent 
of the Defendant and placed the policy with him. The 
Defendant insurance company issued the policy to its 
agent, and he forwarded it to the first agent. The first 
agent placed his sticker on the policy and retained part 
of the commission. The Court held that the first agent 
became the agent of the Defendant insurance company 
and that the company was charged with the knowledge 
of the facts of ownership which were acquired by this 
first agent. Accordingly, it was held that the company 
waived the defense in the policy of the Plaintiff not hav-
ing fee title. The Court in that case cited the general law 
12 
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on the subject as stated at 3 Cooley on Insurance, pp. 
2529,2530: 
"If an insurance agent, to whom a request for in-
surance is made, procures all or part of such in-
surance, through other agents, from a company 
not represented by him, and receives the policy 
written by such company for delivery to the ap-
plicant, he will generally be regarded as the agent 
of the company issuing the policy, especially if he 
receives a part of the premium as commission. 
The principle underlying this doctrine is that the 
company issuing the policy ratifies the acts of the 
first-named agent, and constitutes him its agent 
for that transaction by accepting the application 
and by issuing and delivering the policy to him 
for further delivery to the applicant. Hence, it 
follows that the company will be charged with 
knowledge of any information imparted to the 
agent at the time the insurance is written." 
The above statement on the general law is certainly 
in keeping with good public policy. Persons such as 
Plaintiffs in the case at bar have no idea concerning the 
machinations and exchanges going on between insurance 
agents and companies. In this case, for instance, State 
Auto assumed the policy for Guarantee Security In-
surance Company. Then we find from State Auto 
through its Denver manager that Kolob Corporation was 
its general agent in 1964 and that Kolob had appointed 
Diversified as a local agent. Then, on November 28, 
1964, State Auto cancelled the appointment of Diversi-
fied as agent. 
To further complicate the situation, it appears that 
13 
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not only did State Auto fail to notify Plaintiffs of the 
cancellation, but that Diversified continued to service 
the Plaintiffs under this insurance policy subsequent to 
the purported termination. All plaintiffs knew was that 
they were insured and that the agent had agreed that 
they would receive notification of the expiration of the 
policy in time to renew it. 
The Court correctly instructed the jury in Instruc-
tion No. 15 as to the elements of proof which Plaintiffs 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence in 
order to prevail. These are summarized as follows: 
1. That prior to October 1, 1967, a custom existed 
whereby agents writing fire insurance for Plaintiffs 
would renew such insurance upon expiration of the term 
of existing policy and bill Plaintiffs for the premiums 
then owing without a specific request for such renewal 
from Plaintiffs. 
2. That prior to October 1, 1967, Diversified knew 
of this custom through its employee, Salisbury, an<l 
through him agreed with the Plaintiffs to service their 
policy in accordance therewith. 
3. That on or before October 1, 1967, Defendant 
State Auto was either (a) then represented by Diversi-
fied as its agent, or (b) had failed to give Plaintiffs no-
tice of its termination of Diversified as its agent. 
4. That on or before October 1, 1967, State Auto, 
or its agent, failed to renew the policy in accordance with 
its custom or to give notice to Plaintiffs that it did not 
intend to. 14 
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5. That Plaintiffs in reasonable reliance upon such 
custom were damaged as a consequence of such failure. 
We submit that this instruction correctly submitted 
the case to the jury in accordance with the prevailing 
law. We submit that the Farrington case has established 
the law in Utah to the effect that the knowledge of in-
surance agents is imputed to their principals. Futher-
more, the principal is bound by courses of dealing exist-
ing between its agents and their insureds. 
There was ample evidence to support the finding 
of the jury in Plaintiffs' favor under Instruction No. 15. 
As far as the law concerning custom and practice of 
insurance companies is concerned, we cite the following 
to the Court: 
In the case of Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. of California (1911) 38 Utah 532, 114 P. 134, 
custom and practice became an issue, and the Court cited 
2 Joyce on Insurance, Section 1356 as follows: 
"If an insurance company or its authorized agent, 
by its habits of business, or by its acts or declara-
tions, or by a custom to receive overdue premiums 
without objection, or by a custom not to exact 
prompt payment of the same, or, in brief, by any 
course of conduct, has induced, honest belief, in 
the mind of the policyholder, which is reasonably 
founded, that strict compliance with the stipula-
tion for punctual payments of premiums will not 
be insisted upon, but that the payment may b.e 
treated without forfeiture resulting therefrom, it 
will be deemed to have waived the right to claim 
15 
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forfeiture, or it will be estopped from enforcing 
the same, although the policy expressly provides 
for forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums as 
stipulated, and even though it is also conditioned 
that agents cannot waive forfeitures." 
The Court cited with approval the statement of the 
Loftis case in Ballard v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co. 
( 1933) 82 Utah 1, 21 P. 2d 847. The general statement 
of this principle is stated at 45 C.J.S. Insurance, par. 
712,pp.679,680: 
"An insurance company cannot insist on a for-
feiture for failure to pay premiums in accordance 
with the terms of the policy when its course of 
dealing has been such as to induce the belief in 
insured that strict compliance with such provisions 
will not be insisted on, as where it has been its 
custom to receive premiums or assessments after 
they are due. The essence of such a waiver is a 
course of conduct by insurer reasonably leading 
insured to believe that lapse will not be exacted, 
and to bring a case within this rule it must reason-
ably appear that insurer intended, tacitly or 
otherwise, to waive the right it initially had to de-
clare the policy forfeited, and that insured was 
misled into acting on the honest belief that for-
feiture would not be insisted upon for failure to 
pay in compliance with the terms of the policy." 
and again at p. 682: 
"If it is the custom of the insurance company to 
notify insured of the due dates of premiums, as 
by having its agent bill him or call to collect the 
same, its failure to do so may excuse prompt pay-
ment thereof. Such a custom has been held to 
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override general policy provisions against waiver 
by the agent, * * *" 
See also National Fidelity Life Insurance Co. v. Henry 
(Okla. 1935) 486 P.2d 829; Minnick v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Insurance, 54 Del. 125, 174 A.2d 706; Kaep-
pel v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York (3d Cir. 
1935) 78 F.2d 699, citing May on Insurance, Vol. 2, par. 
356, (a): 
"* * * where from the course of dealing between 
the parties the insured has a right to believe that 
notice will be given to him of the amount due and 
the time it is to be paid, the company cannot in 
the absence of such notice set up the failure to 
pay." 
Also, see 43 Am. J ur. 2d, Insurance, par. 554, p. 571 : 
"Indeed, it is said to be the prevailing rule that 
where an insurer uniformly follows the practice 
of giving notice of payments for such a time as 
leads those insured to believe that notice will be 
given, it cannot declare a forfeiture without no-
tice, or without previously advising those who 
have relied upon receiving notice that the custom 
will be or has been discontinued." 
Also, see Seavey v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 232, 69 N.W.2d 
889. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE ON CUSTOM WAS PROPER-
LY ADMITTED. 
Defendant State Auto complains in Point III that 
the testimony of William Slaugh on custom or usage was 
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improper. The purpose in presenting the evidence of 
Slaugh on custom and practice in the community of Ver-
nal was not in any way an attempt to vary the terms of 
an insurance contract. This we have not attempted to do. 
The purpose for which this evidence was offered had to 
do with the allegations of negligence as to the two De-
fendant agents involved in this lawsuit. The Second 
Amended Complaint charged both Diversified and A-1 
Agencies Diversified with negligence in failing to notify 
the Plaintiffs of the expiration of the policy in question. 
Accordingly, it became germane to the issue of negli-
gence what the custom and practice of the agents in the 
community was with regard to giving notice of expiration 
to their clients. Mr. Slaugh had been an insurance agent 
in the Vernal area for approximately 19 years. He testi-
fied that there was a uniform custom existing as to agents 
notifying clients of expiration of policies and that 
through his contact with the various other agents and 
companies operating in the area that he was familiar with 
this custom. He then testified that it was the custom to 
give notice of expiration dates of policies and also to give 
clients an opportunity to reinstate policies if necessary. 
This evidence was entirely relevant to the issue of negli-
gence and a more than adequate foundation was laid for 
the witness testifying as to the custom and practice. 
Compare the testimony admitted as to custom and 
practice in the case of DeW eese v. J. C. Penney Co. 
(1956) 5 U.2d 116, 297 P.2d 898, and Peterson v. Han-
sen-Niederhauser Inc. (1962) 13 U.2d 355, 374 P.2d 
513. Also, see Brigham Young University v. Liillywhite 
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(10th Cir., 1941) US F.2d 836; Erickson v. Walgreen 
Drug Co. (1951) 120 U. 31, 232 P.2d 210, and W. T. 
Grant Co. v. Karen (10th Cir., 1951) 190 F.2d 710. 
POINT III. 
THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT 
APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
A. STATE AUTO MAKES THIS OBJEC-
TION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS 
COURT. 
No where in the record of this trial was an objection 
made by Defendant State Auto or anyone else as to any 
evidence being inadmissible on the ground of a violation 
of the parole evidence rule. Defendant has waived the 
right to make that objection in this Court. 
B. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE NOT TRY-
ING TO CHANGE THE CONTRACT. 
The parole evidence rule does not apply in this case 
for the reason that there was no evidence offered or re-
cieved in any way attempting to vary the terms of an in-
surance policy. We are not trying to change the terms of 
the insurance policy. However, we do say that when an 
insurance company adopts a course of dealing of giving 
notice and renewing policies to the extent that an in-
sured comes to rely on this, the insurer has waived its 
right to insist on a strict enforcement of the expiration 
of the policy on the day of expiration. Accordingly, 
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Plaintiffs have the right to expect notice of expiration 
and to be billed for the premium. This right became 
established by the course of dealing Plaintiffs had for 
many years with Noble Kimball and which was adopted 
by Diversified. State Auto, when it accepted the Policy 
from Diversified and allowed Diversified to counter-
sign its policy, adopted that custom and practice and be-
came bound by it. Accordingly, State Auto was obligated 
to renew the policy and should be held to its terms. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the case was submitted to the jury 
on correct instructions. The authorities cited herein es-
tablish that insurance companies which adopt a custom 
and practice of giving notice as to expiration dates and 
renewing policies for customers, cannot insist on prompt 
payment if they fail to live up to this custom. The evi-
dence establishes that a course of dealing of long dura-
tion existed between Plaintiffs and Noble Kimball. The 
evidence establishes that Diversified accepted and adopt-
ed this course of dealing. When Diversified placed this 
policy with State Auto and counter-signed it, State Auto 
adopted the course of dealing. State Auto cannot divest 
itself of responsibility in this matter merely by telling us 
that they cancelled their agency agreement with Diversi-
fied. It admits that it gave no notice of the cancellation to 
Plaintiffs. The Court correctly instructed the jury that 
the agency cannot be terminated as to Plaintiffs without 
such notice. 
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Accordingly, State Auto is bound, as it should be, 
by the custom and practice of giving notice and auto-
matically renewing insurance policies. We submit that 
the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK of 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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foregoing Brief of Respondents, postage prepaid, to 
Raymond M. Berry of Worsley, Snow & Christensen, 
7th Floor Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on ~he;{!;. .. day of February, 1971. 
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